Loren Kohnfelder

@lcamtuf@infosec.exchange My friend is a woodworker

@adamshostack@infosec.exchange If only they had a threat model and we could see how they updated it. :-/

@neurovagrant@masto.deoan.org @DavidJBianco@infosec.exchange Nice catch! This should come as a surprise to nobody. Attackers always have big advantages: gloves off, try as much or little as they like, and careless of breaking anything. Reading on, they make it sound like a simple thing to "have a capable model ... avoid guardrail lockout" (how would you even test such a thing outside of prod?) when we already know that guardrails will inevitably either be too restrictive or too loose. Why is all cybersecurity policy I ever see "do the same things only better next time"?

@spaf@mstdn.social How right you are (and were). IMHO this is just one example of a lack of critical thinking about software that's pervasive. Everything (languages, apps, frameworks, protocols) people are totally for or against because: there's precious little serious discussion between the sides, finding consensus with any middle position is so hard. On top of that legacy locks us in so quickly revisiting any of this soon becomes daunting to change later. And the coup de gras software people all think coding proves how logical they are...

@nixCraft@mastodon.social That's the plot of Ender's Game!

@lcamtuf@infosec.exchange There is some real "truth in advertising" here -- imagine how pathetic to say about a person, "He's as much fun to chat with as a spreadsheet."

@neurovagrant Well we do have humans carelessly accepting AI submits without an review: one could consider them an even weaker chain.

@briankrebs@infosec.exchange Maybe what's new is awareness leading to concern: we've had this "rock and hard place" choice for many years. Everyone saw it coming but did nothing: the proverbial boiled frog.

@dangoodin@infosec.exchange "Aren't you confusing the number Found by Mythos with the actual number of vulnerabilities (still unfound)?" The title suggests the unknown vulns are out of sight out of mind. We can be nearly certain Mythos didn't find the all and we cannot put an upper bound on the number. Also an important question is "Breakdown the 271 by severity and confirmed exploitable."

@annaecook Sounds like they 100% approve of all you wrote to me. Those people always find something to gripe about - and very few of them put significant work into the world (or they'd understand writing trade offs and how you cannot make everyone happy). Agree 💯 with the main point: I think of AI delivering the "average of the corpus" which, considering how much sub-par stuff outnumbers quality work, must be mediocre at best. https://annaecook.com/writing/2026/ai-prototyping-harder-worser-faster-wronger

@Em0nM4stodon@infosec.exchange well stated, and deletion begins with an accurate inventory of data holdings. Just as it's wise to plan software lifecycle through retirement, plan to wipe data eventually.

@maxleibman unintended consequences, table turns, the true high cost of #phishing ?

@adamshostack@infosec.exchange My two cents: Sandboxing, perhaps doubled up, would be a good practice going forward: compared to all the model inference the software overhead must be miniscule. https://designingsecuresoftware.com/writings/more-observations-on-the-openai-huggingface/

@TechDesk@flipboard.social @TechRadar@flipboard.com @Engadget@flipboard.com Meta should share their threat model for this feature in order to back up the claim that there's nothing here. Otherwise it's just "trust us, it's fine". https://arxiv.org/abs/2511.08295

@evacide@hachyderm.io Yes! And I'm writing about going further, software makers should publish their threat models so customers know the security posture. https://designingsecuresoftware.com/writings/flaunt/

@adamshostack @kaidenshi Tell me you don't know or don't care about security without telling me you don't know or don't care about security. This reminds me of the ".NET" v1 release: we invested in Code Access Security (making least privilege very easy to implement) and the Dev Division apps explicitly asserted full privilege on start up and never reduced it. The just make it work, security be damned culture lives on. And they must have known what they were doing since they announced: "To increase security awareness, 95% of employees have completed the latest training on guarding against AI-powered cyberattacks, ... to improve security awareness. " [https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/security/blog/2025/11/10/securing-our-future-november-2025-progress-report-on-microsofts-secure-future-initiative/] Saddest of all: hardly any customers will jump ship, if they even notice.

@cube_drone@mastodon.social It's as if a foreign adversary made a "Trojan horse app" that simply amplifies our online culture as its secret weapon.

Agree but with 180 degree opposite valence with a recent non-toot post claiming, "The openai agent sandbox escape ... showed the power and capability of agents" My take: https://designingsecuresoftware.com/writings/ai-agent-parody/

This may be the kickstart that Linux on the desktop has always needed to gain major adoption. (This is not a comment on online age-verification, just about human nature.) [the URL tells the story; I didn't need to click] https://www.tomshardware.com/software/linux/california-lawmakers-unanimously-pass-linux-exemption-from-age-verification-law-software-distributed-under-the-gpl-mit-bsd-and-apache-licenses-are-exempt

@parismarx@mastodon.online Tell me you don't understand "AI" without telling me you don't understand "AI". With over 50 years in software I have grave concerns: what is the bar for how tech literate? Concerns never "evaporate" but they can be blatantly suppressed or disregarded.Some concerns (threat modeling): fighting AI fire with AI fire, courtesy Gemini -->## 1. Risk Profile: Massive public spending risks subsidizing superficial AI adoption, while sovereign compute mandates invite severe U.S. trade retaliation under CUSMA.## 2. Present-Day Uncertainties: U.S. opposition to sovereign compute threatens hardware supply chains, while capital deployment outpaces lagging, ill-defined regulatory guardrails.## 3. Winners and Losers: Subsidies heavily favor centralized corporate "national champions," while mid-career workers face displacement without any mandated legal or retraining protections.## 4. Unmitigated Risks: Missing workforce protections risk mass labor disruption, and infrastructure delays may force defaults back to dependency on foreign hyper-scalers.## 5. Oversight Framework: Accountability is fragmented across existing bodies, leaving the primary auditing arm (CAISI) with analytical powers but no legal enforcement authority.## 6. Consideration of Recognized AI Positions: Funding heavily concentrates architectural power into state-backed supercomputers and large corporations, completely marginalizing open-source and decentralized models.## 7. Consultation and Disclosure of Contrary Opinions: The final strategy acts as a unified consensus document, completely erasing dissenting architectural pathways or formal disclosures of conflicting expert opinions.

@neurovagrant@masto.deoan.org OMG is this as big and basic a secure design flaw as I think it is: trusting the client will faithfully cache server generated tokens, when we know that "role": "assistant" tagged tokens get a self-trust boost. That's like an online shopping site letting me upload my cart and name the prices for my order. Once again: is nobody threat modeling at all or are they missing elephant sized threats somehow?

@evacide@hachyderm.io Beyond why, I'm working on how to make inroads to turn it around even a little. I'm always interested in ideas along that line if anyone cares to share.

@adamshostack@infosec.exchange The recent AI agent security debacle must be reverberating quite a lot within the walls of the major proponents of AI agentic technology because they announced a brand new "movement" apparently with zero details available yet. If that isn't a sign of flat-footedness then I don't know what is.

@annaecook@mastodon.social Total agreement but in my experience the pre-"AI" meetings were not exactly paragons of decision making.

Flock Cameras Can Surveil Cars Without License Plates is actually very clever. This is an instance of the same technique behind browser fingerprinting. Naturally, this suggests a defensive mitigation. Swap removable decals and bumper stickers and different roof racks to make your car untrackable day to day. (Note: it’s surprising to me that it’s necessary given that I can’t recall seeing unlicensed vehicles on the road except for the corner case of new cars with temporary licenses, but these are unlikely to have many bumper stickers etc.)

@adamshostack@infosec.exchange 100% not written by an LLM!

@rogeragrimes@infosec.exchange So by your definition, what color is a mirror?

@geniodiabolico @bruces What you said about eXtreme Programming sure sounds like vibe coding, and the name is fitting.

@quinn@social.circl.lu So true, and they are often commissioned by newspapers (as if they were relevant to thinly reported stories), and special interest groups to sway public opinion. Not to mention that wording of questions is highly influential, the pool of respondents is biased, ... How this sort of thing persists is beyond my imagination.

@briankrebs@infosec.exchange Mine

@seldo@alpaca.gold IANAL but I would cite [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_T.J._Hooper]

@bert_hubert@fosstodon.org The phrasing of "wishing to check for error" is so nonchalant as if error checking was a whimsical curiosity. How many dependencies on this I wonder, and how many check for error?