David Steckler

@epixoip@infosec.exchange @noahtheduke@indieweb.social @sc00bz@infosec.exchange Re: secret scrubbing, prevention of swapping to disk, etc. in gc languages: This can sometimes be accomplished by calling directly down into OS mem mgmt functions, often handled by standard libraries. One example: C#/dotnet has a SecureString class. On Windows, SecureString.Clear() calls the Win32 API SecureZeroMemory() *I have no information on whether this type of thing is actually done in the case of Bitwarden, cross-platform disclaimers apply, YMMV, etc.

@epixoip@infosec.exchange @noahtheduke@indieweb.social @sc00bz@infosec.exchange Glancing through bitwarden source, looks like it uses Rust functions to call client OS apis, inc cred management. I see no evidence it is doing anything to either zero memory that held plain text passwords, nor calling the necessary functions to prevent swapping of memory (inc passwords) to disk. In fact it looks like it is lobbing plain text passwords back up to the typescript/electron layer. Ouch. Would be interesting to learn how #1password handles this.